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INTRODUCTION

Mental health law, which originated only about twenty years
ago,' has reached a turning point. Born in the aftermath of the civil
rights movement, and seizing the momentum of the criminal procedure and prisoners' rights revolution, the field was built on a constitutional foundation that grew out of concern for protecting the rights of
patients. But that constitutional foundation is now crumbling, and as
* Copyright 1991 by David B. Wexler and Bruce J. Winick. This essay is a revised
version of a chapter in D. WEXLER & B. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(1991).
** John D. Lyons Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, University of Arizona.
*
Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. See B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972); see also Brooks & Winick,
Foreword. Mental Disability Law Comes of Age, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 235, 235 (1987).
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a result mental health law seems to have lost its driving force and
much of its lustre.
Bruce Ennis, appropriately described as the founder of the
mental health bar,2 set the stage for advocacy and scholarship in a
1971 article which argued that "if persons are involuntarily to be confined because of mental illness, the standards and procedures for confinement should guarantee no fewer rights than those afforded
criminal defendants." ' While early case law seemed to embrace this
premise,4 the attraction soon wore off.5 Indeed, even in the heyday of
mental health law, the courts rarely accorded mental patients the fullblown rights accorded to criminal defendants. 6 In any event, the
criminal procedure revolution has now surely been quelled, 7 leading
to a concomitant calm in the evolution of mental health law.' A new
perspective is needed to rejuvenate the area and to infuse it with aca2. R. ISAAC & V. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 109 (1990).
3. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 108 (1971). The
article's publication in the Criminal Law Bulletin is in itself a significant statement regarding
the original relationship between mental health law and the criminal law field.
4. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (recognizing equal protection and
substantive due process rights for defendants committed as incompetent to stand trial);
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (recognizing equal protection rights of mentally ill
prisoners at expiration of prison term to receive due process commitment hearings normally
accorded civil patients); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (concerning
procedural and substantive due process requirements for civil commitment), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.) (requiring
minimum due process standards for mental institutions).
5. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding informal clinical determination
sufficient as matter of due process for institutionalization of minor child being committed by
parent); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (rejecting beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof for civil commitment in favor of clear and convincing evidence standard);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (avoiding decision on whether institutionalized
patients have a constitutional right to treatment).
6. See, e.g., R. REISNER & C. SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 702, 712, 723 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing whether rights to
counsel, jury trial, and probable cause hearings apply in civil commitment context).
7. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (applying harmless error
doctrine to coerced confessions). One sign of the decline is the growing attempt to base
constitutional claims on state constitutional provisions. See Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (discussing constitutional
criminal procedure issues). The call for relying on state constitutions has been made in the
mental health law area as well. Meisel, The Rights of the Mentally Ill Under State
Constitutions, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1982); Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes
as Sources of Rightsfor the Mentally Disabled. The Last Frontier?, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1249
(1987).
8. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (rejecting prisoner's assertion of
right to refuse antipsychotic medication); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983)
(permitting indefinite confinement of insanity acquittees).
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demic appeal. The time has come to conceptualize new approaches
and research directions.
This Essay seeks to stimulate discussion about the future of
mental health law, and to offer a new approach. Our research interests have increasingly focused on what we have come to call therapeutic jurisprudence-the extent to which substantive rules, legal
procedures, and the roles of lawyers and judges produce therapeutic
or antitherapeutic consequences. 9 The purpose of the present essay is
to describe what we mean by therapeutic jurisprudence and to explain
how the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective can be used to identify
a fresh set of research issues for law and mental health, and to develop
the foundation for a second generation of law reform.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is interdisciplinary, empirical, and
international in its orientation. It seeks to sensitize legal policy makers to a frequently ignored aspect of mental health law policy analysis-the therapeutic impact of legal rules and procedures-and to
serve as a tool to frame a new and useful research agenda. Ironically,
mental health law--one of the potentially most interdisciplinary of
legal fields-has fallen considerably short of accomplishing its interdisciplinary potential. Not only has far too little empirical work been
done in the field, but much of what has been done focused on ques9. See D.

WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
(1990); D. WEXLER & B. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
For other explicit applications of the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, see Klotz,
AGENT

Limiting the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: The Therapeutic Potential, 27 CRIM. L. BULL.
416 (1991); Schopp, The Psychotherapist'sDuty to Protect the Public: The AppropriateStandard
and the Foundation in Legal Theory and Empirical Premises, 70 NEB. L. REV. 327 (1991);
Schopp & Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care: Psychotherapists and
Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163 (1989); Wexler, Health
Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27 CRIM.
L. BULL. 18 (1991) [hereinafter Wexler, Health Care Compliance]; Wexler, Inducing
Therapeutic Compliance Through the CriminalLaw, 14 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 43 (1990)

[hereinafter Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance]; Wexler, Insanity Issuer After
Hinckley: Time for a Change, 35 CONTEMP. PSYCHOLOGY 1068 (1990); Wexler, Training in
Law and Behavioral Sciences: Issues from a Legal Educator'sPerspective, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
197 (1990); Wexler & Schopp, How and When to Correctfor Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental
Health MalpracticeLitigation:Some PreliminaryObservations,7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 485 (1989);
Wexler & Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A New Approach to Mental Health Law, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW (D. Kagehiro & W. Laufer eds.) (forthcoming);
Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment. The Distinction Between Assent and Objection,
28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment];
Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 169 (1991) [hereinafter Winick,
Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization];Winick, Harnessingthe Power of the Bet:
Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Wagering with the Government].
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tions that are not especially significant to legal decisionmakers. As a
result, the impact of such research too often has been minimal.
One empirical question rarely asked concerns the therapeutic
implications of various legal rules and practices. Is a particular legal
rule, either presently in effect or proposed, therapeutic or antitherapeutic to patients (and perhaps to society as a whole)? Legal decisionmaking should consider not only economic factors, public safety,
and the protection of patients' rights; it should also take into account
the therapeutic implications of a rule and its alternatives. For example, the decision whether to abolish the legal insanity defense should
turn, at least in part, on the therapeutic implications abolition would
have on patients and on society as a whole. Similarly, the complex
problem of whether to recognize a right to refuse treatment should
turn, at least in part, on the therapeutic impact of the right. In addition, governmental policies in a variety of areas not as closely related
to mental health law per se should take account of therapeutic impact
in any rational decisionmaking process that assesses the effects of
alternative legal approaches. It is natural that therapeutic jurisprudence initially focus on the core content areas of mental health law. It
also, however, will have applications in forensic psychiatry, health
law, and a variety of allied legal fields, including criminal law, juvenile
law, and family law, and probably across the entire legal gamut.' 0
Let us, at the outset, emphasize that therapeutic jurisprudence
does not embrace a vision of law, or even mental health law, as serving exclusively or primarily therapeutic ends. We do not call for a
return to the "therapeutic state" or extol what Wexler once called
"therapeutic justice."' "I The law serves many ends, and our suggestion that the impact of legal rules and practices on therapeutic values
should be analyzed does not mean that therapeutic values should
predominate others. Nor do we suggest that the law should assume a
deferential posture toward clinical expertise. Many of the issues at
the heart of mental health law are legal, not clinical, in nature.' 2
10. Even in an area far removed from mental health law, the Supreme Court has indicated
a willingness to consider therapeutic values. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 568 (1960). The Supreme Court has even been described as having a therapeutic
function, often serving as a non-directive psychotherapist. W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW,
LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 399-402 (1972). Professor Weckstein has asserted that the concept
of justice embraces much more than truth, and that therapy might itself be a component of
justice. Weckstein, The Purposes of Dispute Resolution: Comparative Concepts of Justice, 26
AM. Bus. L.J. 605, 608, 624 (1988). Although therapeutic jurisprudence probably ought to
begin by focusing on on mental health law, it can obviously have implications and applications
far beyond the mental health law area.
11. Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289, 291 (1972).

12. For example, what is considered a mental disorder for a variety of legal purposes,
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Legal issues should not be permitted to masquerade as clinical ones;
indeed, rather than deference, the law should adopt a healthy skepticism toward claims of clinical expertise. The several examples of
therapeutic jurisprudence at work provided later in this essay should
drive home the essential point that therapeutic jurisprudence is
neither a surrogate for paternalism nor an excuse for coercion.
Indeed, a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis often will provide support for civil-libertarian claims.
Legal judgments are often based on factual predicates that
remain unexamined empirically and that might prove false. Some
legal judgments disregard the potential impact they may have on therapeutic values. Our aim is to suggest that legal decisionmakers explicitly take account of this impact, that they become more sophisticated
about and make better use of the insights and methods of the behavioral sciences, and that behavioral scientists audit law's success or failure in this regard.
We are sensitive to the potential criticism of therapeutic jurisprudence that has often been made of law and economics scholarship. By
suggesting the need to identify the therapeutic and antitherapeutic
consequences of legal rules and practices, we do not necessarily suggest that such rules and practices be recast to accomplish therapeutic
ends or to avoid antitherapeutic results. Whether they should is, of
course, a normative question that calls for a weighing of other potentially relevant normative values as well, such as patient autonomy,
constitutional rights, and community safety.
Therapeutic jurisprudence simply seeks to focus attention on an
often neglected ingredient in the calculus necessary for performing a
sensible policy analysis of mental health law and practice-the therapeutic dimension-and to call for its systematic empirical examination. To identify this as a significant consideration is not intended to
suggest that it trumps other considerations. The premise that a rule
or practice is antitherapeutic, like the premise that a rule is inefficient,
does not support the conclusion that the rule should be changed in the
absence of a shared, although perhaps unarticulated, normative major
premise.
Modern analytical philosophy has made us sophisticated about
the function of language and the important differences between
descriptive and normative propositions. One simply cannot reason
from the "is" to the "ought" without implicitly embracing a normaalthough partially a clinical question, is essentially a normative or legal issue. See Winick, The
Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 46-53 (1989).
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tive principle justifying the leap--at least not without committing
what G. E. Moore termed the "naturalistic fallacy."'"
We assume there is general agreement that, other things being
equal, mental health law should be restructured to better accomplish
therapeutic values. But whether other things are equal in a given context is often a matter of dispute. Although therapeutic jurisprudence
seeks to illuminate the therapeutic implications of legal practices, it
does not resolve this dispute, which requires analysis of the impact of
alternative practices on other relevant values.
In addition to its usefulness in performing a policy analysis of
legal rules and practices, therapeutic jurisprudence holds great potential as a new research tool for mental health law and related areas.
Although this essay does not suggest a particular substantive research
agenda, it seeks to show how such an agenda might be constructed.
In what follows, we illustrate the potential contribution of therapeutic
jurisprudence to research by describing some ongoing research efforts,
suggesting some new avenues of research, and demonstrating how the
academic and research community might use the therapeutic jurisprudence lens to identify novel research issues.
II.

RESEARCH APPROACHES

Therapeutic jurisprudence research has both an empirical and a
non-empirical dimension. The non-empirical aspect can be performed
by legal academics who are comfortable working with mental health
and behavioral science literature, and by behavioral scientists who are
comfortable working with legal materials. Typically, the intellectual
enterprise is to tease out the potential therapeutic and antitherapeutic
implications of a legal rule and its alternatives. When there is a substantial literature available, this type of research basically relates a
body of therapeutically relevant behavioral science to a body of law
and explores the fit between the two. In the process, certain legal
schemes and arrangements may stand out as comporting particularly
well with therapeutic interests, while others may seem less satisfactory from a therapeutic viewpoint. If the therapeutically appropriate
legal arrangements are not normatively objectionable on other
grounds, those arrangements may point the way toward law reform.14
13. G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 66 (1903).
14. For articles following this stylistic format, see Wexler, Grave Disability and Family
Therapy: The Therapeutic Potential of Civil Libertarian Commitment Codes, 9 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 39 (1986); Wexler, Health Care Compliance, supra note 9; Wexler, Patients,
Therapists, and Third Parties. The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 1 (1979) [hereinafter Wexler, Victimological Virtues].
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The empirical research domain is, of course, best inhabited by
the behavioral scientist, although legal consultation typically will
prove fruitful. Principally, the empirical task is to view the relevant
law, rule, procedure, or legal role as an independent variable and to
ascertain the therapeutic consequences that flow from alternative
legal arrangements. Settling on appropriate measures of therapeutic
outcome is an interesting and integral conceptual and methodological
component of the overall task.
The situation presented in Parham v. J.R.15 is illustrative. In
Parham, the Court rejected an adversarial judicial hearing when parents seek to commit a minor child to a mental hospital. 16 Although
Chief Justice Burger defended his judgment based on concerns that a
hearing would burden the family relationship and be detrimental to
the therapeutic goals of hospitalization, others have questioned these
assumptions and suggested that there is therapeutic value in holding
formal commitment hearings.1 7 In order to resolve this controversy,
the conflicting therapeutic consequences of such hearings must be
identified and defined in ways that can be measured. Moreover, there
must be general agreement on how to compare these consequences. It
may be difficult to reach agreement on standards for conducting such
a comparison of perhaps conflicting therapeutic consequences; this
essentially involves the sharing of normative premises about which
there may be no consensus. But research from the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective should at least allow the identification and
empirical examination of a number of the factual premises that are
central to the respective contentions.
An additional methodological question concerns the appropriate
time frame to be considered when assessing therapeutic and antitherapeutic consequences. Transferring patients from a hospital or nursing home to the community, for example, may appear antitherapeutic
if only the short-term impact (and accompanying "transfer
trauma")" on patients is considered. When the assessment is made
15. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
16. Id. at 610.
17. See, e.g., Ensminger & Liguori, The TherapeuticSignificance of the Civil Commitment
Hearing: An UnexploredPotential,6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978); Perlin, An Invitation to the
Dance. An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren Burger's "Time-Consuming Procedural
Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981); Perry
& Melton, Precedential Value of JudicialNotice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J.
FAM. L. 633 (1983-84).
18. See, e.g., Cohen, Legislative and EducationalAlternatives to a Judicial Remedy for the
Transfer Trauma Dilemma, II AM. J.L. & MED. 405 (1986); Colette, Liberty from Transfer
Trauma. A Fundamental Life and Liberty Interest, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1982);
Karalis, Transfer Trauma: The Medicolegal Aspects, 15 LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC. 4
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after a period of community adjustment, however, the therapeutic
advantages may outweigh the short-term antitherapeutic impact. The
Parham Court's intuitive understanding of these issues is reflected by
its comment that "it is appropriate to inquire into how such a [commitment] hearing would contribute to the successful long range treatment of the patient."' 9
There is, of course, a clear-cut link between the literature-based
assessments and the empirical studies. Typically, the former efforts
will produce theoretically derived speculations about the therapeutic
consequences of certain legal schemes. But only fresh empirical work
specifically tailored to measuring the therapeutic outcome of particular legal arrangements will reveal whether the world in fact works in
the way the armchair academics speculated it would.

III. CURRENT RESEARCH
Without doubt, the most ambitious empirical research effort ever
conducted in mental health law is currently being undertaken by the
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Mental Health and the
Law.2" The twelve-member task force, chaired by John Monahan of
the University of Virginia, conducts and commissions major mental
health law research studies. The beginning stages of the multi-year
program are devoted to research in three principal areas: competence
(both civil and criminal), risk (i.e., prediction of dangerousness), and
coercion.
While the MacArthur Network is not explicitly focused on matters of therapeutic jurisprudence, its basic mission-to test the
assumptions underlying current mental health law-is entirely consonant with the therapeutic jurisprudence approach. Moreover, some of
its studies can clearly be conceptualized as falling within the therapeutic jurisprudence domain. In the area of competence, for instance,
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Zinermon v. Burch, 21 which
focused attention on the previously neglected issue of competency to
consent to voluntary hospitalization, has prompted the MacArthur
Network, and particularly task force members Paul Appelbaum and
(Mar. 1987); Levitan, Nursing Home Dilemma? Transfer Trauma and the Noninstitutional
Option: A Review of the Literature, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 653 (1980); Comment,
Involuntary Relocation of Nursing Home Residents and Transfer Trauma, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J.
758 (1981).
19. 442 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
20. The authors of this Essay are directly involved with the research conducted by the
MacArthur Foundation. Professor Wexler is a task force member, and Professor Winick is a
consultant.
21. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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Thomas Grisso, to pursue the development of instruments that will
provide an empirical foundation for examination of this issue. Presumably, that research may help shed light on the distinction between
clinical competence and the ability to express assent, and will pave the
way for other researchers to study the therapeutic consequences of
treating assent as competence or as incompetence. In his recent critique of Zinermon, Winick, writing from the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence, constructs a theoretical justification, grounded in
principles of cognitive and social psychology, for the presumed therapeutic advantages of voluntary hospitalization over involuntary commitment.22 Winick suggests that Zinermon, if taken literally, could
undermine much of the therapeutic value of the voluntary hospitalization process by requiring an inquiry into competency as a condition
for voluntary admission. He then explores several models of assessing
competency in this context, arguing that a formal judicial model
should be rejected in favor of an informal model relying on assessment by an independent clinician, lawyer, or lawyer-supervised lay
advocate. Winick's theoretical analysis of these issues raises important questions meriting empirical examination. The MacArthur
research on competency could enable such an empirical assessment.
At a time when state legislators and administrators are considering
needed revisions to voluntary admission procedures to meet
Zinermon's concerns, such research could serve as an essential predicate to informed and sensible decisionmaking.
In the area of risk, the MacArthur Network is studying not only
predictors of dangerousness (e.g., delusions, impulsivity, psychopathy,
and anger control), but, through the efforts of Paul Slovic, also the
phenomenon of the perceived dangerousness of mentally ill persons.
There already exists a lively labeling theory literature on the stigma of
a mental illness or mental patient label.23 But there have been no
studies examining the effects of labeling patients as dangerous. Such a
label might be affixed to a patient as a byproduct of a legal proceeding
or as a result of public authorities demanding that a dangerously disabled person take therapeutic steps to control the disability.24
Slovic is investigating a number of fascinating aspects of the process of labeling individuals as dangerous, such as whether a label of
22. See Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 9.

23. See, e.g., Link, Cullen, Frank & Wozniak, The Social Rejection of Former Mental
Patients: Understanding Why Labels Matter, 92 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1461, 1463-70 (1987)

(reviewing research on the stigma of labels).
24. Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance, supra note 9, at 46-50 (discussing the
possibility of bringing reckless endangerment prosecutions against dangerously disabled
noncompliant persons).
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dangerousness "decays" more slowly than other labels, including
labels which merely recast the phenomenon of dangerousness as the
probability of doing harm.2 5 Obviously, the intensity and durability
of a stigmatizing label can have major consequences for the labeled
person. From a therapeutic jurisprudence standpoint, it would be
interesting to study not only the reaction of others to the label, but
also the extent to which the label affects the self-concept and future
behavior of the labeled individual. Thus, the question whether the
law should rely on a prediction of dangerousness as a predicate for
legal consequences, ranging from civil commitment to enhanced punishment, should turn not only on the accuracy with which clinicians
can predict future dangerousness and the impact on public safety and
constitutional values,26 but also on the future therapeutic consequences for the labeled patients.
The area of coercion, the last of the MacArthur Network's initial
triad of research interests, is the one that has to date been the least
systematically investigated. Accordingly, the Network's opening
research efforts focus not on coercion in any objective sense, but look
instead at patients' subjective perceptions of being coerced. Initially,
coercion is being viewed as a dependent variable. Ultimately, the project should fit nicely into a therapeutic jurisprudence framework, for
"subsequent research will explore what the effects of such perceptions
or experiences are on outcomes such as treatment compliance and
treatment efficacy." 2 Indeed, Winick, probing the psychological
literature on choice, suggests that voluntary treatment and hospitalization arrangements, as opposed to those which patients perceive as
coercive, will increase patient compliance and intrinsic motivation to
succeed. 2" Accordingly, Winick suggests, legal rules, such as those
defining competency to consent to treatment and hospitalization and
the procedures mandated for their assessment, should be structured to
take into account these therapeutic implications. The principles on
which Winick builds his analysis deserve empirical assessment in the
25. Slovic, Studies of Perceived Risk and Perceived Dangerousness of Mentally Ill Persons
4-5, 15-18, 26-27 (Jan. 11, 1991) (unpublished working draft on file with authors).
26. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR

(1981); Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital

Sentencing: Evidentiary and ConstitutionalConsiderations, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1981).
27. Monahan, Hoge, Lidz, Roth, Bennett, Gardner & Mulvey, Toward a Theory of
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission 2 (Jan. 10, 1991) (unpublished working draft on file
with authors).
28. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 9, at 46-53; Winick,
Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 9, at 192-99; Winick, Wagering
with the Government, supra note 9, at 752-72.
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particular contexts he discusses, and the MacArthur Network's
research on coercion could enable such assessment.
The MacArthur Network research effort on coercion is being
guided in part by the social psychological literature on procedural justice.29 That literature relates compliance with legal decisions to a litigant's perceptions of fairness in the process. How much "voice" has
the litigant had? How much influence? How much support from
others? The literature looks at both a litigant's process control and
his or her outcome control. This initiative plainly has therapeutic
jurisprudence implications for the design of procedural requirements
in numerous settings affecting patients, offenders, juveniles, families,
and others.3 ° Moreover, these participatory process values sometimes
may have an important role in shaping even substantive legal rules,
such as the distinction Winick proposes in his work on the informed
consent doctrine between assent and objection in the definition of
competency.31
IV.

USING THE THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE LENS

Obviously, one interested in therapeutic jurisprudence could
mine the procedural justice literature with a view to considering how
legal proceedings in the mental health area, such as commitment and
conditional release hearings, might be modified to increase a litigant/
patient's perception of fairness and, perhaps, to increase treatment
compliance and treatment efficacy. The therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective can provide a useful lens through which to view an
existing body of literature in order to discover new value and applications. Thus, a legal researcher attuned to the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective might read a work on health care compliance
principles with an eye on how the mental health legal system might
exploit those principles, an exercise recently conducted by Wexler.32
Similarly, the behavioral expert in health care compliance might
29. See, e.g., E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

(1988); T. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Lind, Kanfer & Early, Voice,
Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness
Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 952 (1990). For analysis of the
participatory value of hearings from a legal perspective, see Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The ConstitutionalDilemma
and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 801-06 (1989).
30. See Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV.

146 (1989).
31. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 9, at 27-46.
32. See Wexler, Health Care Compliance, supra note 9, at 19, 31-34 (suggesting that judges
at conditional release hearings could facilitate compliance with medication orders by invoking
psychological principles of health care compliance, such as use of behavioral contracts).
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approach the legal literature with an eye to exploring how the legal
system might best accommodate the body of health care compliance
knowledge. In this way, therapeutic jurisprudence can provide a useful tool to maximize the utility of existing interdisciplinary research
by identifying its perhaps previously unappreciated value and by spotting new and beneficial applications.
The therapeutic jurisprudence lens has even greater potential in
the design of new interdisciplinary research projects. In the past,
interdisciplinary research has often probed the wrong questions, or at
least has failed to probe questions that are critical to legal decisionmaking. Therapeutic jurisprudence identifies a new scale on which
legal rules, procedures, and roles can be weighed. The results will be
extremely useful in the design and redesign of such legal arrangements. Therapeutic jurisprudence can thus identify a series of issues,
many of which have never been examined, that can help resolve a
variety of open legal issues, can provide new ammunition for dismantling legal arrangements that frustrate therapeutic values, and can lay
the foundation for a new system of mental health law that is more
consonant with its fundamental therapeutic mission.
The therapeutic jurisprudence lens may operate to generate new
research topics which have high law-reform potential. Its usefulness
in the identification of new research questions, the answers to which
can significantly affect legal doctrine, can be illustrated by an examination of three important areas: the right to refuse treatment, the
constitutionality of coercive treatment of death row inmates found
incompetent to be executed, and the need to consider new mechanisms to improve treatment of criminal defendants found incompetent
to stand trial.
A.

The Right to Refuse Treatment

The right to refuse treatment is one example of how therapeutic
jurisprudence can identify a new area of research that will be useful in
the resolution of a critical question in mental health law.3 3 The controversy concerning recognition of a patient's right to refuse treatment has largely ignored the question whether such recognition
would be therapeutically beneficial or detrimental to the patient.
Would such recognition lead to refusal of beneficial treatment so that
33. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Winick, supra note 12, at 2-3 &
nn.2 & 3 (citing expanding body of case law and commentary on the right to refuse treatment
question).
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patients will "rot with their rights on," as some have suggested?34 Or
would its recognition, by empowering patients, provide them with a
context in which they could learn self-determining behavior, acquire
decisionmaking skills, and attain functional capacities that would be
extremely useful in community adjustment?
In addition, will providing choice concerning treatment enhance
the potential that such treatment will be efficacious? Will it engage
such potentially significant psychological mechanisms as the goal setting effect, or the Hawthorne effect or other interactive mechanisms
that enhance the potential for therapeutic success?35 Moreover, will

according patients a right to refuse treatment restructure the doctorpatient relationship in ways that will enhance its therapeutic potential? Will it encourage doctors to negotiate with their patients and
explain to them the rationale for recommending a particular course of
treatment, rather than treating them paternalistically? 36 Will recognition of the right promote the dialogic process and increase its significance in ways that will produce greater patient compliance with
treatment recommendations, set up patient expectancies that will
facilitate success, improve patient attitudes toward treatment, and
increase patient motivation to improve?
The therapeutic jurisprudence approach identifies these largely
unexamined empirical questions as critical to a sensible resolution of
the right-to-refuse-treatment dilemma. The approach suggests that
legal commentators need to re-examine the existing literature on subjects such as the psychological value of choice.37 It suggests that
empirical research be performed to determine whether the theories
and hypotheses that can be generated from this literature apply to
mental patients, as opposed to other populations. Finally, it suggests
the need for a third generation of right to refuse treatment research,
supplementing the legal theoretical work that has been done38 and
the empirical studies of the impact of various right to refuse treatment
34. See, e.g., Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug Refusal Involuntary Medication,
and "Rotting with Your Rights On," 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327 (1980).
35. See Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 9, at 46-53 (analyzing

therapeutic value of patient choice).
36. See R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-

PATIENT RELATIONS (1979); Wexler, Doctor-Patient Dialogue. A Second Opinion on Talk
Therapy Through Law, 90 YALE L.J. 458 (1980) (reviewing R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF
STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS (1979)).

37. See supra note 28.
38. See, e.g., Winick, Legal Limitations on CorrectionalTherapy and Research, 65 MINN.
L. REV. 331 (1981); Winick, supra note 12; Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Medication: Current State of the Law and Beyond, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 7 (D. Rapoport & J. Parry eds. 1986).
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cases on patient, judicial, or hospital staff behavior.3 9 Whether a right
to refuse treatment should be recognized may ultimately be a constitutional question, but judicial and statutory definition of its parameters and procedural requirements can be critically affected by the
answers to questions raised by examination of the right from the therapeutic jurisprudence perspective.
B.

Treatmentfor Incompetent Death Row Inmates

In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court decided that the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment prohibits a
state from executing a defendant who has been sentenced to death but
whose mental health has so deteriorated while on death row that he
has become incompetent to be executed. 4° Virtually all states had previously recognized, either by statute or case law, that execution of a
death row inmate who had become incompetent should be suspended
during the period of the defendant's incompetency, and could occur
only following mental health treatment which succeeds in restoring
the defendant's ability to understand and appreciate the reason for the
execution. Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Ford constitutionalized this practice and imposed procedural due process requirements for determination of the incompetency-to-be-executed issue,
the Court's decision did not address whether the state could coercively treat the incompetent death row inmate in order to restore him
to competency so that the death penalty could be administered.
In 1990, however, in the case of Perry v. Louisiana," the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this previously
unresolved question: Do such death row inmates possess a right to
refuse treatment that is designed to restore them to competency?
Perry presents the right-to-refuse-treatment question in a difficult ethical context for clinicians. The American Medical Association and the
American Psychiatric Association submitted a joint amicus curiae
brief arguing that such coercive treatment placed clinicians in an
untenable ethical role.42 Aside from this submission, Perry was
39. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Hoge, EmpiricalResearch on the Effects of Legal Policy on the
Right to Refuse Treatment, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION, supra
note 38, at 87; DeLand & Borenstein, Medicine Court, IT. Rivers in Practice, 147 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 38 (1990); McKinnon, Cournos & Stanley, Rivers in Practice. Clinicians'
Assessments of Patients' Decision-Making Capacity, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
1159 (1989); Veliz & James, Medicine Court: Rogers in Practice, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62
(1987); Zito, Haimowitz, Wanderling & Mehta, One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a
New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 295 (1989).
40. 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
41. 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).

42. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the American Medical Association
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briefed and argued along conventional constitutional lines, with the
defendant asserting a fundamental constitutional right to refuse intrusive mental health treatment, and the state asserting a compelling
governmental interest in imposing such treatment in order to allow it
to accomplish its compelling interest in carrying out the state's capital
punishment scheme. After hearing argument, the Supreme Court
decided to avoid resolution of the question for the time being and
remanded the case to the state court for reconsideration in light of its
intervening decision in Washington v. Harper.43 Harper had rejected
a constitutional right to refuse treatment claim in the context of a
state prison's assertion of the need to involuntarily treat a dangerous
prison inmate with antipsychotic medication.' The constitutional
issue framed by Perry thus remains open, to be considered by a variety
of state and lower federal courts prior to what almost inevitably will
be the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue in the future.
Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests an additional dimension that
should be considered in the resolution of the Perry issue: What are
the therapeutic implications of permitting the state to treat coercively
a defendant found incompetent to be executed? First, the consequences to the healing professions, the psychiatrists and psychologists
asked to provide such treatment, should be considered, and these
would appear to be antitherapeutic. Does the use of therapists as an
adjunct to the administration of capital punishment undermine their
primary role as healers? Does it corrode their sense of themselves as
members of a healing profession? Does it raise grave ethical and emotional conflicts that deter many good clinicians from working in the
correctional context? Does it decrease the standing of these subgroups with other professional peers? Does it deter some from
becoming psychiatrists or psychologists? Does it breed distrust
among patients generally? If the answer to at least some of these
questions is yes, then the practice of coercive treatment of incompetent death row inmates could seriously diminish the quality of treatment that prisoners (and perhaps other institutionalized populations)
receive, and drive many ethical and sensitive practitioners from the
field or deter them from entering it.
as Amici Curiae at 16, Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990) (No. 89-5120) [hereinafter
Amici Briefl. The ethical dilemma had received widespread discussion in the literature. See,
e.g., Appelbaum, Competency to be Executed: Another Conundrum for Mental Health
Professionals,37 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 682 (1986); Radelet & Barnard, Treating
Those Found Incompetentfor Execution: Ethical Chaos with Only One Solution, 16 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297 (1988); Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to Be Executed,
96 YALE L.J. 167 (1986).
43. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
44. Id. at 1039-40.
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Second, is such "therapy" efficacious? Death row inmates facing
execution upon successful treatment would inevitably be motivated to
attempt to resist and, indeed, to frustrate such treatment. Even
organic treatment like psychotropic drugs may require a degree of
patient compliance to succeed. Moreover, expectancy theory and
other strands of cognitive psychology would suggest that psychological mechanisms which play an essential role in treatment success
might also be impoitant ingredients in the success of organic treatment techniques.4 5 It therefore could be predicted that patients are
likely to exhibit a behavioral response to such treatment that sets up
failure or, at a minimum, makes success difficult. This is not to say
that patients cannot be restored to competency by involuntary treatment, but only that it probably will be difficult, frustrating, and ultimately dehumanizing work for both clinician and patient.
Although this class of patients might be incompetent for some
purposes, such as execution, their incompetency will not necessarily
prevent them from responding behaviorally to what they undoubtedly
will understand to be the consequence of successful treatment-their
execution.46 This would seem to be a particularly salient example of
what in therapeutic jurisprudence terminology is known as "lawrelated psychological dysfunction" or "juridical psychopathology."47
This example is similar to a number of the dysfunctional elements of
the criminal justice mental health system that Wexler described in his
early work on criminal commitment contingency structures.4" It is
also reminiscent of a similarly dysfunctional aspect of Florida law on
competency to stand trial that Winick has criticized.49
The Florida provision in question produced what Winick
described as a predictable behavioral response on the part of Florida
incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants. The provision, a former Flor45. See, e.g., Harper, 110 S.Ct. at 1050 n. 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rennie v. Klein, 462
F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd in part, modified inpart, and remanded, 653 F.2d 836
(3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Durham & LaFond, A Searchfor
the Missing Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the
Mentally I1, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 303, 367-68 (1988); Winick, Competency to Consent to
Treatment, supra note 9, at 50 & n.118.
46. See B. BRAGINSKY, D. BRAGINSKY & K. RING, METHODS OF MADNESS: THE
MENTAL HOSPITAL AS A LAST RESORT

49-52 (1969); Wexler, Token and Taboo.- Behavior

Modification, Token Economies, and the Law, 61

CALIF.

L.

REV.

81, 84-87 (1973) (describing

examples of rational, self-regarding behavior of mental patients).
47. D. Wexler, supra note 9, at 5.
48. PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE CRIMINAL
Sales ed. 1977).
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49. See Winick, Incompetency to Stand Triak Developments in the Law, in
DISORDERED
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Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
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ida Rule of Criminal Procedure, 50 was adopted in the early 1970's as a
result of an apparent misreading of Jackson v. Indiana.5 Jackson
placed constitutional limits on the duration of commitment of defendants found incompetent to stand trial, requiring that those for whom
restoration to competency was unlikely would have to be either civilly
committed or released. 5 2 The Florida rule went beyond Jackson,
declaring that all permanently incompetent defendants, those who
under Jackson appeared unlikely ever to be restored to trial capacity,
be adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity.5 3 Defendants facing
serious charges were thereby given an incentive to become permanently incompetent, and the number of such defendants on Florida's
forensic wards noticeably swelled. It can be hypothesized that a similar contingency structure occurring in the context of treatment of
incompetent death row inmates, which makes the ultimate aversive
consequence of execution available contingent on the defendant's successful response to treatment, will cripple the therapeutic enterprise.
Permitting involuntary treatment of death row inmates found
incompetent to be executed predictably will have a number of
strongly negative implications for therapeutic values for both professionals and patients. The existence and extent of these negative therapeutic implications are empirical questions deserving careful research
as a predicate to the sensible resolution of the issue left open in Perry.
If shown to exist, these negative implications should be factored into
the inevitable balance that the courts will need to perform in analyzing the constitutionality of involuntary treatment in this context.
This analysis may not be dispositive of the Perry issue, but it provides a potential argument for striking a different balance than the
Supreme Court has on the basic question of the constitutional validity
of the death penalty. In cases like Gregg v. Georgia,54 the Court has
basically determined that the state's interest in capital punishment
outweighs the death row inmate's interest in his life. When the issue
is the constitutionality of involuntary treatment designed to enable
the prisoner to be executed, in addition to the state's interest in carrying out a death sentence, the prisoner's interest in avoiding it, and the
intrusions of unwanted mental health treatment, therapeutic jurisprudence identifies previously unrecognized considerations that may well
tip the balance in favor of finding such treatment unconstitutional.
50. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a)(5) (1972) (repealed 1977).
51. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).

52. Id. at 731-39; see also Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 921, 939-40 (1985).
53. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a)(5) (1972) (repealed 1977).

54. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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A potentially countervailing therapeutic implication can be
invoked, however. If death row inmates found incompetent to be executed are not subject to involuntary treatment, they presumably
would remain in a permanent incompetent state. This too could be
seen as a law-produced dysfunctional effect, one that would have to be
counted as a negative therapeutic implication. What should we do
with such defendants? In their joint amicus brief in Perry v. Louisiana, the American Medical Association and American Psychiatric
Association suggest that we automatically commute their sentences to
life imprisonment, and this seems a sensible and humane proposal."
Defendants then could be offered treatment on a voluntary basis,
which presumably would be accepted free of the disincentives producing the strongly negative motivation for treatment that execution
would obviously provide. Such treatment probably would be effective
in restoring such patients to a greater degree of mental health. This
result would have only positive therapeutic implications. It would
also avoid the presumably negative impact which coerced treatment
has on professionals.
Unfortunately, the automatic commutation of sentences would
make the status of being found incompetent to be executed more
desirable, and probably would produce a predictable behavioral
response on the part of death row inmates. But this identical behavioral response already is encouraged by the Supreme Court's constitutional holding in Ford v. Wainwright.5 6 Because Ford requires that
death row inmates found incompetent to be executed have their
executions suspended, they will already be provided an incentive to
become incompetent or to pretend to be so.5 7 How much additional
motivation in this direction will commutation of sentence provide?
Perhaps only a marginal amount. If so, then this objection would not
be a serious one.
As this preliminary and somewhat speculative analysis suggests,
conducting a therapeutic jurisprudence assessment of compulsory
treatment of death row inmates who are incompetent to be executed
55. See Amici Brief, supra note 42, at 25.
56. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
57. In this respect, Ford exemplifies "law-related psychological dysfunction." See D.
WEXLER, supra note 9, at 5. Although perhaps dysfunctional, the Ford decision is fully
defensible on considerations other than those relating to therapeutic values. A normative
principle-the notion that it does not comport with human dignity to execute a defendant who
is so mentally ill that he is unable to understand and appreciate why he is being put to deathdrives the Ford analysis. In our view, this normative principle justifies the Court's decision in
Ford even if it is shown to be antitherapeutic in effect. This analysis illustrates that therapeutic
values, although relevant to a great many legal decisions, may not be dispositive of the legal

issue.
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involves difficult and unexamined empirical questions. Therapeutic
jurisprudence identifies these questions as critical ones that need to be
probed as part of the difficult balancing required for resolution of the
question of coercive treatment for incompetent death row inmates. It
thus suggests a research agenda for social scientists, and the Supreme
Court's remand in Perry v. Louisiana, by leaving the constitutional
question open, at least for now, paves the way for comparative
research in states that take differing approaches to the issue. Perhaps
this research will suggest that the therapeutic implications are conflicting or that they point decisively in one direction. In any case,
such research is needed so that this complex and troubling constitutional, moral, and professional issue can be resolved based on full consideration of the consequences of alternative approaches.
C.

Treatmentfor Incompetency to Stand Trial

Although much work has been done on the assessment of competency to stand trial, little empirical research has examined the treatment process for criminal defendants found incompetent to stand
trial. As a result, almost nothing is known about the treatment provided to defendants placed in this status. Because of the confusion
documented in the literature by clinical evaluators who frequently
equate the incompetency-to-stand-trial standard with the existence of
mental illness,5" it is likely that most defendants found incompetent
are treated like civil patients presenting the same psychiatric diagnosis. Treatment is probably rarely tailored to the specific abilities
needed to be competent to stand trial. Treatment probably focuses on
the patient's psychopathology, rather than the short-term goal of restoration to trial competence, or more appropriately, to competency to
perform the specific trial-related task the defendant has been found
incapable of performing adequately.
In his prior work on competency to stand trial, Winick has suggested that a system of trial continuances replace the formal competency process now existing for defendants asserting their
incompetency as a bar to trial.5 9 The suggestion is that a continuance
of reasonable duration may be granted to the defendant based on a
certificate of counsel that the defendant is, in counsel's opinion,
incompetent. Counsel could be required to certify that the continu58. See, e.g., R. ROESCH & S. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 83-91 (1980);
Winick, supra note 52, at 982.
59. See Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a
Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 281-84 (1987) [hereinafter Winick,
Incompetency to Stand Trial]; Winick, supra note 52, at 979-83.
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ance is sought in good faith and on reasonable grounds and to set
forth the specific observations and statements of the defendant that
form the basis for his request.
A request for continuance, or a subsequent request for a renewed
continuance, could also be conditioned upon the defense attorney's
submission of a statement from a clinician certifying that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, stating that the defendant is receiving appropriate treatment, and predicting that the defendant will be
restored to competency within a reasonable period. This statement
could include a specific treatment plan, detailing the kinds of treatment attempted and proposed, and the anticipated outcome. The
defendant would be permitted substantial freedom in electing the type
of treatment to restore his or her competency. Of course, the place of
treatment will depend on the defendant's bail status. If the defendant
is in custody, treatment will occur either in a jail or in a secure mental
health facility; if released, treatment will occur in the community as
an outpatient or voluntary inpatient.
Based upon the literature on the psychology of choice, 6° it can
be hypothesized that -the potential for successful treatment of defendants who are incompetent to stand trial increases when the defendant
accepts treatment voluntarily rather than as a result of court coercion,
which typically involves an incompetency commitment to a forensic
facility. Winick's proposal can accordingly be viewed as an application of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Whether Winick's proposal for a restructuring of the incompetency-to-stand-trial process would bring about more effective treatment for incompetent defendants is an empirical question that
deserves examination. A jurisdiction wishing to experiment with the
continuance alternative to the traditional formal competency evaluation process can be matched with one that does not. This will enable
a test of whether defendants in the continuance sample respond to
treatment better than a sample of similar defendants from the other
jurisdiction subjected to court ordered treatment after a formal adjudication of incompetency.
Winick's proposal for voluntary treatment as a condition for the
granting of a trial continuance could be joined with his "wagering"
proposal 6' to suggest a new approach to treatment for. trial incompetency that also could be examined empirically. In order to further
increase the efficacy of treatment, the defendant and the court could
enter into a contingency contract. Under the contract, the defendant
60. See supra note 28.
61. Winick, Wagering with the Government, supra note 9.
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would receive the requested trial continuance in exchange for his
agreement to participate in an appropriate treatment program and for
making periodic progress toward the goal of restoration to trial competency, perhaps based on a specified schedule of target goals and
dates, culminating in a restoration to trial competency within a specified period. This contingency contract or "wager" with the court
should, according to Winick's theory, enhance the efficacy of a treatment program for trial incompetency, and the validity of this hypothesis could be tested empirically.
One problem with a wagering model in this context is that for
many defendants the goal of seeking incompetency-to-stand-trial status is to avoid trial indefinitely or even permanently. As a result, such
defendants may have a disincentive to show progress toward the goal
of restoration to competency. An additional reinforcer is thus needed
to offset this disincentive.
In many jurisdictions, the defendant does not* automatically
receive credit against his ultimate sentence for time spent in incompetency commitment.6 2 Other jurisdictions, however, mandate such
sentence credit. The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards recommend that such sentencing credit be
given,63 but this proposal may be criticized from a therapeutic jurisprudence standpoint. Providing sentencing credit will predictably
strengthen the disincentive for incompetent defendants to be restored
to competency quickly. This would be a further illustration of lawproduced psychological dysfunction.
Nonetheless, a method may be available whereby sentence credit
can be used in a wagering context to promote therapeutic ends without seriously running the risk of creating this law-produced dysfunction. In jurisdictions that do not mandate sentence credit, this credit
may be used as a reinforcer in the proposed contingency contract. To
achieve this end, sentencing credit would be provided contingent
upon demonstrated progress towards restoration to competency to
stand trial. Psychological theory suggests that we should reward
competency, not incompetency. Specific credit against any ultimate
sentence can be given for meeting intermediate treatment goals on
schedule, and eventually for reaching the goal of restoration to competency to stand trial. To prevent shamming near the point of restoration, the court may take away or reduce sentence credit already
earned for meeting intermediate treatment goals if the defendant demonstrates slippage. The incentives of the wager should increase treat62. See Winick, supra note 52, at 947.
63. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL

HEALTH STANDARDS

§ 7-4.15 (1989).
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ment efficacy both for defendants accepting treatment in custodial
settings and for those treated in the community.
Restructuring the incompetency-to-stand-trial process so that it
substitutes the use of trial continuances for the formal competency
evaluation process and permits the contingency contracting described,
should expedite efficacious treatment and successful restoration to
competency. Of course, the success of such a proposal depends upon
the availability to incompetent defendants of a range of effective treatment methods and programs tailored to their needs. Recent literature
has proposed a number of innovative treatment programs for defendants found incompetent to stand trial, including a structured cognitive
problem-solving group therapy approach focusing on incompetencyto-stand-trial issues, and a psycho-educational intervention using
videotape, a model of a courtroom, and discussions with defendantpatients concerning the trial process. 64 Such innovative treatment
programs designed specifically for incompetent defendants present a
fruitful area for research.
Whether hospitals or other treatment facilities use innovative
treatment programs or conventional approaches, research would be
desirable concerning the suggested applications of therapeutic jurisprudence in the competency-to-stand-trial context. This research, if
conducted with the court's permission, would not seem to violate
legal requirements. There seems to be no constitutional impediment
to replacing much of the existing competency evaluation process with
a system of trial continuances. Moreover, to the extent that a statutory right to formal competency evaluation exists, the granting of a
continuance requested by the defendant and his counsel (although not
necessarily its denial) could simply be conditioned upon the waiver of
that right. With judicial approval, researchers could conduct a study
of the proposed trial continuances model.
Would it work? Would attorneys seek to manipulate it for delay?
Can judges exercise sufficient controls to minimize abuse? Would it
save money? Would it provide incentives for more expeditious competency restoration? These are several questions that could be
examined. Researchers could select jurisdictions for study that deny
automatic sentence credit for time spent undergoing treatment so that
sentence credit could be used as a reinforcer in the contingency contract. This discussion illustrates how therapeutic jurisprudence can
be used to frame new proposals for changes in law, and to identify
64. See Siegel & Elwork, Treating Incompetence to Stand Trial, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
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new areas of empirical research that can be extremely useful in guiding law reform.
V.

A COMPARATIVE LAW APPROACH

Unlike traditional mental health law, therapeutic jurisprudence
does not necessarily depend on the Supreme Court aggressively spinning out new constitutional rights for its nourishment and survival.
The limited extent of its constitutional dependence enables therapeutic jurisprudence to become more international and comparative in its
scope, allowing for greater interchange among scholars from different
nations. Let us look briefly at two examples.
Elsewhere, Wexler has argued that a rule requiring psychotherapists to warn a particular victim of a patient's potential dangerousness
may be therapeutically sound: if patients overwhelmingly threaten
intimates and family members, as they do in the United States, a
warning rule may operate to bring the potential victim into family
therapy. 65 In a comparative context, we should of course be interested in learning whether the pattern of threatening intimates holds
true in other jurisdictions. If it does not, "transplantation ' 66 of the
rule might work more therapeutic harm than good.
Another example of comparative therapeutic jurisprudence could
look at the use of psychological health care compliance principles to
increase the probability that a conditionally released mental patient
will take prescribed medication. We know, for instance, that if a
court encourages the patient to enter into a behavioral contract and to
make a public commitment to comply, the likelihood of compliance is
enhanced.67 But, in a comparative exercise, we should ask whether a
public commitment is more likely to yield compliance in rural or
homogeneous societies than in urban or heterogeneous ones. 68 Likewise, a court composed of a single judge is arguably better able to
apply these psychological health care compliance principles than an
administrative body, such as Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review
Board.6 9 How, one may ask, might a British mental health review
tribunal fare in using the health care compliance principles?70
65. See Wexler, Victimological Virtues, supra note 14, at 1.
66. See Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MoD. L. REV. 1
(1974).
67. See Wexler, Health Care Compliance, supra note 9, at 27-29.
68. See Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880
(1991).
69. Wexler, Health Care Compliance, supra note 9.
70. Peay, Mental Health Review Tribunals, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 1259 (R. Bluglass & P. Bowden eds. 1990).
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In this way, the comparative perspective can provide an international laboratory for therapeutic jurisprudence research. Just as we
learn much about our own language by studying a foreign language,
the comparative perspective is inherently illuminating. But the therapeutic jurisprudence approach allows even greater opportunities.
Domestic legal restrictions-those emanating from judicial construction of a constitutional provision, for example-might make a change
in legal arrangements appear impossible. This appearance inevitably
will discourage research concerning the impact of legal rules or procedures thought of as unchangeable. The perception of unchangeability
may thus be self-perpetuating, preventing research that examines the
premises on which the constitutional perception of unchangeability is
based. Research based on how other nations deal with an issue
thought beyond change domestically can, however, allow for the
questioning of these premises. Therefore, using the international
arena as a laboratory for therapeutic jurisprudence research can create new research opportunities that can be used to critically examine
assumptions so embedded in domestic law that they are never
questioned.
Winick's prior research on the American competency-to-standtrial doctrine illustrates how therapeutic jurisprudence research conducted in the international laboratory can be used to examine the wisdom of a legal rule thought to be constitutionally unchangeable.
Winick has proposed restructuring the existing incompetency-tostand-trial process to allow defendants who are able to articulate a
desire to stand trial or plead guilty to do so notwithstanding the fact
that their competency is diminished by mental illness, provided their
counsel concur in this judgment. 71 As indicated in the previous discussion of incompetency-to-stand-trial treatment, for defendants who
do not have such a preference but wish to assert their mental illness as
a basis for postponing their trial, Winick proposes substituting a system of trial continuances for the formal competency evaluation
process.
Winick's latter suggestion concerning trial continuances could be
the subject of empirical examination in a domestic laboratory-a state
wishing to experiment with this proposal. On the other hand,
Winick's former proposal-to allow marginally incompetent defendants to stand trial or plead guilty-may be considered impossible to
implement without violating constitutional doctrine. At least this has
been the received wisdom as a result of the Supreme Court's dicta in
71. See Winick, supra note 52, at 979; Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 59,
at 281.
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Pate v. Robinson.72 Pate has been assumed to stand for the broad
proposition that the Constitution places an absolute prohibition on
trying the incompetent defendant.73 This assumption has hampered
empirical research in the competency-to-stand-trial area.74 Winick
has criticized the assumption that the Constitution imposes an absolute prohibition on the trial of an incompetent defendant who wishes
to be tried, but it is unlikely that states will be willing to experiment
with the trial of such defendants for fear that any ensuing convictions
would be vulnerable to due process attack.
Although Winick suggests that there would be therapeutic and
other advantages to permitting the trial of such defendants, it is thus
unlikely that this aspect of his proposal will be testable in a domestic
laboratory. Other countries, however, dealing with the incompetency-to-stand-trial problem without the restrictions of the Pate v.
Robinson gloss on due process, are free to experiment with Winick's
proposal. Indeed, it is possible (if not likely) that at least some countries permit mentally ill defendants to stand trial or plead guilty if
they wish to do so, their mental impairment notwithstanding. The
experience in these jurisdictions could accordingly be examined to
probe the wisdom of Winick's suggestions, and they could be used as
laboratories for empirical research on the question. Should such
research document the existence of therapeutic value and the other
advantages of Winick's proposal, then it would be open for American
courts to discard the Pate v. Robinson dicta.
We do not suggest that all constitutional restrictions be open to
reconsideration in light of the results of a therapeutic jurisprudence
assessment. Many constitutional rules-such as Ford v. Wainwright's
ban of execution of a person found to be incompetent-will be fully
justified on normative grounds even if they produce negative therapeutic consequences.75 In at least some other situations-involving a
rule that seems to be grounded in the Constitution but turns out to be
supported by dicta only, for example, or one based on empirical
assumptions that turn out to be false-the therapeutic jurisprudence
approach can suggest the possibility of reconsideration, and the international laboratory can be used as a locus for research that may reveal
whether such reconsideration is warranted.
72. 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) ("[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally
incompetent violates due process ....").For analysis of this statement as dicta, see Winick,
supra note 52, at 968-70.
73. See Winick, supra note 49, at 926 & n.13 (discussing ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards).
74. Id. at 926.
75. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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We thus hope that researchers will develop a comparative lens as
well as a therapeutic jurisprudence lens and that they will view the
world through that pair of glasses. The exciting prospect is that those
glasses will enable us to forge a research agenda that is at once truly
interdisciplinary as well as truly international.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mental health law needs new directions. We have suggested one
reflecting the assumption that mental health law should serve rather
than disserve the mental health of those it affects. Substantive rules,
and the practices and procedures that implement them, should be
analyzed to determine their impact on therapeutic values. This frequently ignored dimension should be systematically examined with
the tools of the behavioral sciences and the results should factor into
the policy analysis that must precede sensible law reform efforts.
Mental health law has much to contribute to improving the condition and well-being of patients. To reach its full potential, it must
become more empirical and truly interdisciplinary. We propose an
approach in which behavioral scientists and legal analysts join
together to forge a new generation of mental health law scholarship
that can better serve the aims of mental health law.

